Showing posts with label Einhorn. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Einhorn. Show all posts

Thursday, January 29, 2009

Einhorn on Inflation


David Einhorn is now buying gold, the yen, and calls on long-term interest rates. In fact, he sounds a lot like Jim Rogers nowadays – the Fed is going to debase the currency, Ben Bernanke is obsessed with money printing, and so on.

http://www.businessweek.com/print/investor/content/jan2009/pi20090128_208724.htm

But there are a couple of problems with this line of reasoning.

First, it’s not at all what we’re seeing. The risk of a depression is higher than the risk of hyperinflation, at least right now, so to a large degree the Federal Reserve is doing the right thing. They contracted the money supply and didn’t support banks after 1929, and the result is well known.



Second, gold is a horrendous investment under all other scenarios except for high inflation. The supply of gold is massive – there is more gold available now than ever before in history – and demand has dwindled to basically nothing more than use as an inflation hedge. It is one of the most inferior commodities in terms of fundamentals.

If inflation does not occur as predicted, you have no margin of safety. You are left holding a nonproductive lump of metal. In buying gold at current prices, roughly the highest in thirty years, there is not much room for error.

Yet it sounds much more reasonable to tell your investors that you’re holding gold, as opposed to sugar futures or lead futures or whatever else. The fact is that Einhorn’s investors may be better served if he simply held the Rogers Index instead.

Third, higher inflation appears to be turning into a consensus view, and the consensus view is rarely correct. You have to question why investors like Einhorn would even get into these big macro questions, and what competitive advantage they have there.


Incidentally, here are some of my views on inflation. I have held similar views to what Einhorn is currently expressing, since early 2006. But now I am playing the devil’s advocate even with my own reasoning.

The interest rate trade definitely makes sense: coming out of this crisis, rates must rise. Moreover, the yen will continue to strengthen as the carry trade continues to unwind; but it seems that Einhorn is a little late to this party as well, as the yen was probably a better trade in 2008 than it will be in 2009.

I am with Buffett in saying that you’re going to do a lot better with picking great businesses than you will in trading macro events. The latter are just way too difficult to predict.



Tuesday, December 16, 2008

Some Thoughts on Short-Selling


With the backdrop of this year’s historic short-selling successes, I was recently asked why I rarely engage in this practice.


After thinking about it for a while, my answer is basically this: It is too difficult to be consistently right on timing and other factors. Timing matters much more with selling overvalued assets that you expect to depreciate, as opposed to buying undervalued assets that you expect to appreciate.

Over time, stocks generally increase in value, and holding long-term short positions is costly. Moreover, the possibility of unknown, intervening events gives shorting a different risk profile: for example, a weak company might get bought out, leading to a dramatic increase in the stock price.

Sharp surges in price are much more dangerous for the short-seller than are sharp declines for the stockholder. In the latter case, if one does not use margin, volatility scarcely matters as long as the equity remains attractively valued and the fundamentals have not deteriorated.

By contrast, to look at successful short-sales, consider that Bill Ackman had been short MBIA since 2002. In other words, he thought it would fail during the last recession. He took losses over an entire business cycle for the company to finally break down. David Einhorn waited a similar period of time with Allied Capital, as the stock rose smartly.

You can't get a margin call on equity. Or, in other words, the reverse of shorting is buying equity on margin. Imagine buying a stock at $50 and having it drop to $20 – being forced to sell – and then having the stock sharply rebound. This type of thing happens with shorting all the time, making it dangerous to short technology stocks or commodities or whatever else. Highly overvalued assets can get insanely overvalued, long enough for you to get tapped out.

The other option, no pun intended, is to use puts. The problem here is that equity doesn't expire worthless. But with puts, you can be exactly right with your decision, wrong on timing, and the put option expires worthless. (And then, the next day, the stock plunges to $0.) In my view, anything time-sensitive is absolute rat poison, unless the terms are exceedingly generous.

You want to look at it the way Warren Buffett looks at insurance: unless rates are incredibly appealing, relative to risk, then you simply do not write business. As he says, success at investing is all about temperament. The best action is often to take no action at all.
 
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